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Abstract  
The export of EU norms to regulate gas markets and transnational infrastructure has become 
the leitmotif of EU external energy policy in the neighbourhood. This paper compares two 
borderline cases for EU external energy governance in this regard. It accounts for a varying 
degree of convergence with EU norms as the result of an unstable, open, and conflictual 
process. The analytical framework broadens the scope of existing studies on the export of EU 
norms beyond its borders by factoring in geopolitical and market-based constraints and 
influences, which often outweigh EU coercion. It is argued that EU external energy 
governance is more effective, in terms of sustainable convergence, if it is “decentred”. 
 
 









“Safety and Security lie in variety and variety alone.” (Müller-Kraenner, 2008, 19) After 80 
years, Churchill’s principle that energy security requires diversification is still applicable and 
holds particularly true with regard to Europe’s gas supply security. 
EU energy security is confronted with major intertwined challenges, which are a growing 
European demand and regional competition for finite fossil fuel resources, the depletion of 
gas and oil reserves within Europe in the mid-term, the combat against climate change, and 
the need to guarantee affordable and competitive energy prices. The combination of the 
underlying political, economic and environmental constraints increases the importance of gas 
supplies from and through the EU’s neighbourhood.1 At the same time, enduring political 
uncertainties with regard to the future of Russo-Ukrainian relations and repeated gas conflicts 
between Europe’s main supplier and the major transit state have revealed the vulnerability of 
EU gas supply security. Taken together, this underscores the need for more gas import 
diversification and an effective EU external energy policy in the neighbourhood. 
The EU’s strategy to guarantee its energy security in its “near abroad” and reduce risks along 
the supply chain is twofold. Firstly, the EU seeks to integrate neighbouring countries into a 
pan-European market for gas, based on convergence with EU key norms, rules and standards 
(EC, 2011, 6). In this context, the EU has multiplied its bilateral and multilateral instruments 
to export EU energy norms, in order to liberalise and modernise the energy sectors of its 
neighbours. The unbundling of gas sectors, i.e. the separation of network operation from 
production and supply activities, is the linchpin of the EU-envisioned market restructuring. 
Drawing upon this, EU norms are supposed to stimulate competition and investment of 
energy companies and depoliticize the energy supply chain, thereby contributing to EU 
                                                        
1
 The EU’s import dependence on gas is supposed to increase to more than 80% by 2035 (IEA, 2013). 
Neighbouring suppliers will remain crucial for EU gas supply security despite a growing availability of 
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) from remote suppliers. While imports of LNG from unconventional gas 
production in North America hold the potential to mitigate the EU’s dependence on gas supplies from its 
vicinity, more lucrative spot markets in Asia and pending decisions on export licences cast doubts on the 
viability of this option (Ratner et al., 2013). 
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supply security (EC, 2008). 
The second pillar of the EU’s external energy policy in the neighbourhood is the 
diversification of gas imports and supply routes by strategic projects of “Common European 
interest”, in order to reduce European vulnerability, especially vis-à-vis its major, yet 
presumably unreliable supplier and transit state (EP, 2009). The EU’s strategy goes beyond 
the rationale of sheer physical diversification in this point. Indeed, the EU seeks to prescribe 
supplies, volumes and routes and endow import corridors with a common liberal regulatory 
transit framework along the whole pipeline corridor, based on EU norms such Third Party 
Access (TPA), market tariff pricing and investment protection (Weber, 2014a). 
The underlying leitmotif of EU external energy policy in the neighbourhood can be subsumed 
under the term of “external energy governance”, defined as the normative process of 
exporting energy related, EU-centred norms to third countries by different institutionalized 
arrangements. Following its diffusionary logic, one can distinguish between two concentric 
circles of external energy governance that have evolved during the last decade (Padgett, 
2011). Both share the same normative “regulatory core”: The EU hard law embodied in the 
acquis communautaire, on which the internal market for gas is grounded and which the EU 
attempts to project beyond its borders in form of legally binding, precise, and enforceable 
arrangements (Abbott et al., 2000). The “inner circle” is made up by the Energy Community, 
which extends the entire energy acquis to third countries. Initially conceived for candidate 
countries, the Energy Community has also attracted the three neighbouring countries Ukraine, 
Moldova and Georgia, which have only a vague membership perspective at best. Based on a 
multilateral treaty, accession involves the far-reaching adoption of binding and precise EU 
hard norms, which prescribe the governance of domestic markets and a transit regime for 
transnational infrastructure connecting to the EU. Norm adoption and implementation is 
monitored, and can be enforced by centralised institutions (Padgett, 2012). Most neighbouring 
countries maintain, however, less institutionalised energy relations with the EU, which are 
based on a differentiated, multi-layered system of bilateral and multilateral agreements. 
External energy governance in this “outer circle” provides for a more selective approximation 
with EU norms to regulate parts and specific aspects of the supply chain and separate 
transnational infrastructure projects. The EU has managed to engage all key transit countries 
in the Eastern neighbourhood into the inner ring of external energy governance and to export 
key energy norms to major Southern transit countries within the outer ring (Escribano, 2010).  
Instead of focussing on cases, which patently display the success of EU external energy 
governance in terms of norm export (Padgett, 2012; Renner, 2009; Dimitrova and Dragneva, 
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2009), I examine two cases within the outer circle, in which an successful export of EU 
energy norms is not likely: the suppliers Azerbaijan and Algeria. Unlike with transit 
countries, the EU’s vital interest in accessing their resources to limit its vulnerability towards 
Russia and the Eastern Corridor as well as regional competition for their supplies, put the 
Union at the end of the energy interdependence equation. Furthermore, suppliers have less 
interest in adopting liberal EU norms, since this affects the dominant role of their state-owned 
energy companies and loosens the state’s control on an economically and politically crucial 
sector (Perović, 2009). The major question that arises in this context is, whether and how can 
the EU export its energy norms to gas suppliers in the neighbourhood, which are the 
“borderline cases” of EU external energy governance? 
The objective of this paper is to account for the variance of convergence with EU energy 
norms over time and across both countries and to thereby contribute to the wider literature on 
EU norm export in the neighbourhood. By analysing three distinct periods (from 2000 till 
2005, from 2006 till 2010, and from 2011 till 2013), characterised by specific economic and 
political constraints, I seek to shed light on the limits and achievements of EU external energy 
governance under changing conditions. In the first section, I discuss how to grasp the 
outcomes of EU external energy governance and argue that a more nuanced concept of 
convergence is needed, instead of a misleading focus on a “1:1 transfer” of the acquis. Based 
on a critical discussion of major accounts put forward by the literature on Europeanisation and 
External Governance, the second section explores the role of geopolitical and market-based 
factors in explaining convergence. Subsequently, the third section analyses the involvement 
of local public and private actors and the status of neighbouring countries in energy 
cooperation with the EU in order to explain sustainability of convergence with EU norms. 
The conclusion summarizes three major findings. 
 
I. What kind of convergence with EU energy norms and how to grasp it? 
 
As in other policy fields, the overarching goal of the EU’s external energy governance, is a 
far-reaching and preferably legally binding export of EU norms (Lavenex, 2011). Ideal 
typical, neighbours are supposed to firstly select hard EU norms in form of precise rules, 
directives, laws, and standards, subsequently commit themselves to them formally on the 
bilateral or multilateral level, before they adopt them without major modification as domestic 
legislation (Langbein and Wolczuk, 2011). The normative end-point of this EU-prescribed 
process is the extension of the regulatory scope of specific and binding EU norms to 
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neighbouring countries, which is supposed to substantially limit the latter’s room of 
manoeuvre and thereby contribute to EU security (Scott, 2011). With regard to Azerbaijan 
and Algeria, however, EU external energy governance does not result in such a clear-cut 
extension of legally binding, precise and enforceable EU hard norms. 
The outcomes of external energy governance in Azerbaijan and Algeria 
Contrary to some neighbours, who committed themselves to the Directive 2003/55/EC on 
unbundling and the Regulation 1775/2005 on TPA
2
 per binding treaty and transposed these 
rules into national law, Azerbaijan and Algeria have not formally adopted EU energy hard 
law. Yet, the absence of a “1:1 transfer” of the binding, precise and enforceable EU acquis, 
does not mean that EU external energy governance towards both suppliers has not led to any 
notable outcomes reflecting EU key norms. However, these outcomes are “softer”, as selected 
and adopted norms are less “legalised”, i.e. legally binding, precise and enforceable than EU 
hard law (Abbott et al., 2000). 
In the second half of the 2000s Azerbaijan subscribed to adopting the Directive 2003/55/EC 
and Regulation 1775/2005 in a non-binding Memorandum of Understanding (2006), prepared 
four draft laws for national transposition and supported an Intergouvernmental Agreement 
(IGA) regarding the pipeline project Nabucco (2009)
3
, which provides for partial TPA of 
Azeri deliveries. Furthermore, the country adopted EU standards for metering and billing and 
a law to create an independent tariff council as a first step towards “minimal unbundling” in 
the early 2000s, while a later adopted IGA between Azerbaijan and Turkey (2012) reflects 
provisions of the Nabucco IGA on investment protection and tariff pricing. Algeria adopted 
far-reaching law reforms to establish an independent energy regulator and a new investment 
                                                        
2 Generally, unbundling aims at ending the exclusive control of major energy producers over transmission 
networks, which is hindering market access of competitors. Three different models have emerged in the light of 
member state resistance. “Ownership unbundling” as the most far-reaching and EU-preferred option implies the 
full separation of generation and transmission activities. If companies control both parts of the supply chain, they 
have to sell some parts of their assets. The second option foresees that in this case companies would not have to 
sell their network assets but transfer its management to an Independent System Operator (ISO), in charge of 
commercial and investment decisions. The third, “minimal unbundling” option enables dominant companies to 
retain their network assets under mere supervision of an Independent Transmission Operator (ITO) (Escribano, 
2010, 214). Third Party Access (TPA) is an extension of the unbundling principle to transnational infrastructure. 
3
 The Nabucco pipeline has been the EU’s flagship pipeline project within the Southern Gas Corridor to deliver 
gas from Caspian and Central Asian producers to Europe. Its route, runs along the most vulnerable “South 
Eastern Achilles’ heel” of European gas supply security, through the Balkans up to Austria (Weber, 2014b). 
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regime in 2005, without explicitly referring to the EU energy acquis, but borrowing major 
contents and underlying principles from it. However, in a move towards re-nationalisation of 
the Algerian energy sector, most of these laws were revised just one year later, while 
Azerbaijan neither adopted the provisions of the memorandum, nor the IGA on Nabucco. 
Nonetheless, compared to the case of Russia, where EU external energy governance patently 
failed to influence energy regulations (Barbé et al., 2009; Yafimava, 2011), outcomes in 
Azerbaijan and Algeria do reflect EU energy norms to a limited and varying extent.  
 
Grasping the degree and sustainability of convergence with EU energy norms  
The evaluation of EU external policy in terms of norm export has become a central concern in 
literature. As the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) itself, a multitude of studies is still 
biased by the experience of the enlargement of candidate countries in the 2000s, when the EU 
was able to export the entire acquis communautaire to candidate countries through a “1:1 
transfer” (e.g. Mahncke and Gstöhl, 2008; Schimmelfennig et al., 2006). Many authors 
evaluate the effectiveness of neighbourhood policies by relying on a binary dependent 
variable that is, the adoption or rejection of an unmodified acquis (e.g. Schimmelfennig et al., 
2006; Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, 2008; Kratochvil and Lippert, 2008). However, taking the 
far-reaching, legally binding, precise and enforceable outcomes of the norm transfer during 
the enlargement process as baseline for the evaluation of neighbourhood policies is 
misleading, since the EU foreign policy faces a very different and far less promising 
environment in the neighbourhood than in most candidate countries (Weber, 2012). Firstly, 
the bargaining power of the EU is much smaller vis-à-vis the Eastern and Southern 
neighbours, since the EU’s main incentive of a credible membership perspective is not at 
offer (Sasse, 2005). This makes a coercive transfer of the acquis less likely. Secondly, the 
weaker identification of elites with the Union and the lower legitimacy of its constitutive 
norms result in very different resonance structures for EU policies, rendering voluntary 
adoption less likely (Bafoil and Weber, 2014). Hence, the EU cannot impose and rely on its 
pre-defined hard norms to the same degree, as it was the case during accession negotiations 
under the exceptional circumstances of enlargement. This is why empirically and 
conceptually it is hardly accurate to speak of “norm transfer” in the context of EU 
neighbourhood policies (Barbé et al., 2009). Indeed, a comparison with the successful norm 
transfer during enlargement must fall short, since it establishes too ambitious criteria and 
expectations for the evaluation of EU norm export in the neighbourhood. Consequently, such 
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a comparison tends to lead to a negative judgment or even to the negation of any tangible 
results.  
However, EU norm export in the neighbourhood is not a “all-or-nothing process” as different 
degrees of export are possible, which involve the diffusion of some policy contents and 
features without “copying” EU norms sensu stricto (Dolowitz and March, 2000, 13). In order 
to grasp this conceptually underexposed “grey zone” between a normative “1:1 transfer” and 
no norm export at all, one can rely on the concept of “policy convergence”. The notion 
focuses on the “[...] similarity between one or more characteristics of a certain policy [...]” 
(Knill, 2005, 768). While taking EU promoted hard norms as point of departure, the concept 
moves the analytical focus to the actual outcomes of external energy governance. The 
comparison between both enables students to evaluate the “degree of convergence”, i.e. to 
which extent outcomes in third countries reflect specific contents, principles, and institutional 
features of EU energy norms. With regard to the temporality of convergence, one can identify 
three stages, which are “selection”, “adoption” and “implementation” (Lavenex and 
Schimmelfennig, 2009, 801). Selection refers to the commitment, which neighbouring actors 
undertake with regard to EU norms by bilateral and multilateral agreements or unilateral 
decisions. Adoption relates to the actual transposition of convergence into national legislative 
acts and policies by domestic actors. Both stages raise the question of the “sustainability” of 
convergence on the level of outcomes. Convergence with EU norms is considered to be 
sustainable if selected contents, principles and features translate into legislative action and 
continue to persist over time. If convergence in agreements stops short of, or is cut back and 
overthrown once it has reached the stage of adoption, it proofs to be unsustainable. As the 
final stage of implementation involves a multitude of actors and variables on the national and 
subnational level of third countries (Blum and Schubert, 2009), it is considered as separate 
question of convergence beyond the scope of this paper.   
 
II. Convergence and the limits of EU bargaining power: Factoring in markets 
and geopolitics 
 
The export of EU’s norms to regulate markets and infrastructures collides with major interests 
of both energy suppliers. First and foremost, suppliers are interested in securing demand at the 
highest possible price (Perović, 2009, 36). Furthermore, the energy sectors of both countries 
are characterised by a high level of state control along the supply chain and limited 
competition, which are at the heart of an intransparent system of energy rent distribution 
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(Overland et al., 2010; Aissaoui, 2001). EU external energy governance on the other side, 
promotes a comprehensive reform agenda geared towards liberalisation based on three 
principles: a narrowly defined role of the state as regulator, investment protection and non-
discriminatory access and competition along the supply chain. The underlying assumption is 
that functioning, de-politicised markets are the key to secure uninterrupted and sufficient 
supplies at the lowest possible price for European consumers (CIEP, 2004). As unbundling, 
TPA and market pricing aim to benefit EU consumers but negatively affect political elites and 
national oil and gas companies (NOC) in neighbouring supplier countries, one wonders how 
convergence with EU energy norms took place despite this mismatch. 
 
The limits of EU bargaining power and the role of markets and geopolitics 
A major explanation put forward by the literature on Europeanisation and External 
Governance in order to account for the success or failure of EU norm export is the “power 
based explanation” (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009). Grounded in rational 
institutionalism and derived from the underlying theoretical assumptions of the “logic of 
consequence” (March and Olsen, 1989), it stipulates that an asymmetrical power in its favour, 
allows the EU to coerce neighbouring countries to select and adopt its norms (e.g. Barbé et 
al., 2009; Schimmelfennig, 2012). 
According to the logic of consequence, actors choose strategically between available options 
based on the evaluation of the consequences of their decisions. From this perspective, the 
degree of convergence with or rejection of EU norms is the result of rational neighbouring 
actors maximising their net benefits in their relations with the EU. The Union can alter 
cost/benefit calculations of neighbouring actor by offering credible and tangible incentives 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005). 
Yet, unlike with other neighbouring countries, the EU does not hold a superior bargaining 
power towards both energy-rich suppliers, who find themselves in strong bargaining position. 
First and foremost, the Union depends to a growing extent on crucial natural gas deliveries 
from both countries. Azerbaijan and Algeria, however, might reduce the dominant role of the 
EU in their export portfolio, by delivering more gas to alternative consumers via pipeline or 
LNG. Furthermore, the major incentive at offer to engage neighbours in a process towards 
far-reaching convergence, the incremental access to the internal market, is of minor interest 
for both suppliers. Hydrocarbons make up for more than 90 and 98 per cent respectively of 
the exports of Azerbaijan and Algeria (EIA, 2013a, 2013b) and do not face significant 
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obstacles or tariffs when being delivered to the EU. Additionally, their powerful NOCs 
SOCAR and SONTRACH can already access, operate and invest in the liberalised European 
energy market. Hence, deprived of major incentives, one expects EU external energy 
governance to achieve no or only a very minor degree of convergence. 
However, cost/benefit calculations of neighbouring actors are more complex and have to be 
embedded in a broader context. Two points are to be made here. Firstly, neighbouring actors 
find it difficult to carry out clear-cut cost/benefit assessments with regard to the EU’s external 
energy governance, since EU incentives, their credibility and adoption cost are often 
imprecise and in flux (Sasse, 2008). Hence, actors might come to an inaccurate assessment of 
costs and benefits, due to incomplete information and bounded rationality (Dolowitz and 
March, 2000). The second point relates to the analytical emphasis on EU coercion. While the 
“power based explanation” highlights the role of EU incentives and bargaining power vis-à-
vis neighbouring actors, it understates the role of other external influences that might play a 
crucial role in their decision-making deliberations. This seems to be particularly relevant for 
norm export in the field of energy, where cost/benefit assessments of actors are influenced by 
volatile gas markets and geopolitical constraints (Orttung et al., 2009; Youngs, 2009). 
International and regional energy markets can favour or disfavour suppliers by increasing or 
decreasing their financial capacities, resources and the need for Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI), which is foremost provided by international oil and gas companies (IOCs). 
Furthermore, markets shape the economic attractiveness of different available alternatives. 
Analytically, one can distinguish between “supplier markets”, characterised by high prices 
and demand as well as supply scarcity and “consumer markets”, characterised by decreasing 
prices, limited demand and multiplied supply alternatives. At the same time, regional 
geopolitics can constrain available alternatives or open up new ones, while geopolitical 
threats and rivalry put pressure on actors to find means to contain and counterbalance them. 
Drawing upon this, it is argued that decision-making deliberations of neighbouring actors 
with regard to convergence with EU energy norms are less driven by EU incentives than by 
market-related and geopolitical constraints on the regional and international level. That is not 
to say that EU incentives are negligible, but to grasp EU coercion as one external influence 
among others, neighbouring countries as geoeconomic and geopolitical centres of their own 
are exposed to (Fisher Onar and Nicolaidis, 2003).  
Conceptually, the notion of “norm diffusion” captures best the insight that convergence is the 
result of a norm export process, which is more than a unilateral coercive transfer, involving 
EU and neighbouring actors (Barbé et al., 2009). As norm transfer, norm diffusion focuses on 
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policy change as independent variable, e.g. in form of norm selection and adoption, but holds 
the advantage to consider an array of more comprehensive causal explanations beyond mere 
EU coercion of neighbouring actors (Börzel and Risse, 2009). Rather than overstating EU 
agency, it allows for factoring in economic and geopolitical externalities, which influence the 
diffusion of EU energy norms by manipulating cost/benefit calculations of neighbouring 
actors (Heinze, 2011).  Market externalities and the varying need of neighbouring actors for 
FDI to achieve their objectives, point to the important role that energy companies play in this 
context. Being major, economically and financially powerful actors involved in production 
and transport (Orttung et al., 2009), their actions can influence the diffusion of EU energy 
norms and further convergence, bypass, or oppose it.  
 
Accounting for convergence by factoring in markets and geopolitics 
 Developing supplier markets 
In the early 2000s supplier markets emerged, as the increase in available oil and gas 
production was exceeded by the growth of European and international demand, which led to a 
steady, yet limited, increase in European gas prices (IEA, 2013). This market situation 
contributed to increasing supplier revenues and rendered investment in export capacity more 
lucrative.  
In this context, both countries pursued a strategy to improve gas distribution and increase 
their gas production as well as their export revenues (Bowden, 2009; Darbouche, 2011a). 
European destination markets presented themselves as the most profitable ones, due to limited 
transport costs and the highest regional prices. Furthermore, the two suppliers faced the 
challenge to satisfy a growing domestic demand and modernise their out-dated domestic gas 
distribution systems and production facilities. Despite slowly increasing export revenues, 
financial resources remained limited, which is why Azerbaijan and Algeria featured a need for 
FDI to achieve their goals. While prospects of high export revenues and the need for 
investment in the energy sector and transport infrastructure furthered convergence with liberal 
EU energy norms, trade-related EU incentives and financial support through the TACIS and 
MEDA programme, played only a minor role in the cost/benefit assessments of neighbouring 
countries (Darbouche, 2011b; Franke et al., 2010). 
In Azerbaijan, which was just about to emerge as a gas producer, decision-makers were 
largely inexperienced with regulatory questions, which increased their uncertainty regarding 
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the consequences of convergence with liberal EU norms (Bowden, 2009). In Algeria only a 
small group of powerful governmental actors under Energy Minister Khleil Chaki was in 
favour of far-reaching liberalisation to increase supply and revenues (Darbouche, 2008). Until 
2005, Azerbaijan selected and adopted EU standards for billing and metering to improve the 
quality of its distribution network, increased domestic prices to limit demand growth and 
established an independent tariff council to further investment (Energy Charter Secretariat, 
2011). Algeria established an independent energy regulator to unbundle the energy sector and 
adopted a hydrocarbon law, which provided for more competition and market access. While 
the outcomes in both countries reflect a notable degree of convergence with technical 
standards and EU norms on unbundling and market pricing in terms of selection and adoption, 
convergence was only sustainable in the case of Azerbaijan.  
 
 Peaking supplier markets and geopolitical pressure in the East 
From 2005 to 2010 European prices for imported gas escalated and increased up to 240 per 
cent (IEA, 2013, 164). This strong upward trend was driven by a steadily growing gas 
demand, tightening output, and sharpened by repeated Russo-Ukrainian gas crises. The 
thereof resulting windfall increase in energy revenues provided suppliers with abundant 
financial resources, which increased their financial autonomy as well as the budget 
contributions of their NOCs. 
These developments enabled Algeria to change its strategy towards a more assertive “resource 
nationalism” to achieve its goals of domestic gasification, higher production and exports 
volumes more autonomously (Darbouche, 2011a). While an Independent System Operator 
remained formally in place, however, with reduced competences, the government revised 
reform steps towards liberalisation of the upstream sector and more competition, by adopting 
the amended law 05-07 in 2006. This strategic shift took place due to strong domestic 
resistance against the revision of SONATRACH’s dominant market power. The underlying 
rationale of the amendment was to strengthen and internationalise SONATRACH as producer 
and exporter instead, in order to benefit from a favourable market situation by maximising 
benefits along the supply chain without loosing out on state-controlled energy revenues and 
strategic control over resources and investment (El-Katiri, 2010). The EU failed to address 
Algeria’s re-nationalisation of the energy sector. Additional incentives provided by the Union 
for the Mediterranean, were limited to multilateral projects in renewable energies (Escribano, 
2010; Darbouche, 2011b). 
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Azerbaijan as a comparatively small energy supplier also benefited from increasing energy 
revenues, yet to a lesser extent. More importantly, the country was exposed to increasing 
geopolitical pressure from its biggest neighbour. Russia opposed Azerbaijan’s role as 
significant energy exporter vehemently and engaged on different levels to prevent Caspian 
gas from reaching its markets in Europe. Moscow used its political and military support for 
the Armenian side in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as leverage, sought to purchase large 
volumes from the Azeri Shah Deniz gas field (SD-II) and increased gas prices for its own 
exports to Azerbaijan. Furthermore, it signed memoranda with member states and European 
Energy companies to facilitate the South Stream project, which aimed at making a pipeline 
project from Azerbaijan to Europe unnecessary (Sartori, 2012; Bowden, 2009). In 2008, the 
Russian-Georgian War caused further worries about Moscow’s willingness to use military 
means in the region. Confronted with the need to counterbalance Russia’s realpolitik, 
Azerbaijani political leaders pursued the strategy to increase energy interdependence with the 
EU, in order to thereby engage the Union in the region and Azerbaijan’s export endeavours. 
In this context, decision-makers strategically subscribed to specific regulatory EU provisions 
in the hope to reach a strategic partnership on the implementation of a westbound pipeline and 
supply security. In 2006, Baku and Brussels signed a memorandum, which stipulated that the 
neighbouring country would reform energy tariffs, as well as establish an independent energy 
regulation authority (ISO) and Transmission System Operator (TSO). As the document 
clearly refers to the adoption of Directive 2003/55/EC and Regulation 1775/2005, it displays a 
high degree of convergence in terms of rule selection. The same is true for the 
Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) on the Nabucco pipeline. The Commission-drafted IGA, 
provided for TPA concerning 50% of the supply volumes, investment protection and market 
tariff pricing. It was actively supported by Azerbaijan, although provisions reduced the 
influence of supplier countries and upstream companies, including SOCAR, along the whole 
route. 
However, convergence failed to translate into adoption. As to the IGA, this was related to 
setbacks with regard to sourcing, routing and lacking private financing for the EU preferred 
Nabucco project, while other pipeline projects promoted by major European energy 
companies seemed economically more feasible without imposing regulatory constraints 
(Sartori, 2012). Secondly, boosted by accumulated, abundant financial resources, SOCAR’s 
strategic and economic ambitions went beyond its initial role as mere crude exporter by the 
early 2010s. It became clear, that particularly the far-reaching directive on unbundling would 
have imposed serious constraints on these ambitions. Additionally, Azerbaijan engaged 
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Turkey and its state company BOTAS in a geoeconomic energy partnership on common 
infrastructure and further gas deliveries. This provided the Caucasian producer with 
alternative, economically booming and normatively undemanding energy partners to facilitate 
and secure westbound gas exports (Kardas, 2011). 
 
Developing consumer markets and geopolitical pressure in the South 
In the early 2010s, regional gas markets changed in favour of consumers and led to a decrease 
in energy prices. The major reasons for this shift were the availability of cheap LNG supplies 
from remote gas producers, favoured by the “shale gas boom” in North America and a 
decreasing European demand due to economic recession.  In this context, energy revenues of 
suppliers decreased, while infrastructure projects faced economic uncertainty. 
In order to overcome the “Nabucco deadlock” caused by supply and financing shortcomings 
and to pre-empt potential LNG imports from substituting scheduled gas deliveries to Europe, 
Azerbaijan agreed with Turkey on the Trans Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP), in which the 
Azerbaijani state company SOCAR took a majority stake. This fait accompli made the 
Eastern part of Nabucco obsolete, put the non-European section of the Southern Gas Corridor 
under Azerbaijan’s control and left only the final decision on the routing on European 
territory open. Deprived of attractive incentives to offer, the Commission reacted by dropping 
its clear preference for Nabucco and its IGA, as neither SOCAR, BOTAS, nor European 
energy companies involved in the upstream in Azerbaijan, were ready to subscribe to the 
EU’s restricting TPA provisions along the reconfigured pipeline (Rzayeva, 2013). However, 
and quite surprisingly so, the TANAP IGA  is clearly inspired by the Nabucco IGA. While it 
does not provide for TPA, provisions reflect EU norms on tariff pricing and investment 
protection. 
It was not before prices slumped and the Arab Spring destabilised the Southern 
neighbourhood geopolitically that Algeria opened up to energy cooperation with the EU 
again. In the context of the Arab Spring, public spending increased by 50% (Masetti et al., 
2013). Confronted with decreasing production and a booming domestic gas demand, the 
country needed FDI to untap further, less accessible resources and guarantee sufficient energy 
revenues. In 2013, the EU and Algeria signed a memorandum (2013) after five years of 
negotiations. However, not much is left from the initial text, proposed by the Commission, as 
references to EU norms have vanished and the EU was unable to offer tangible incentives to 
prevent the document’s erosion in this regard. Yet, some articles on potential liberalisation of 
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the upstream sector and investment protection hint to possible venues for some convergence 
with EU norms in support of better access and business conditions for private energy 
companies. 
 
III More sustainability through legitimacy: The decentring of EU external energy 
governance 
 
While factoring in geopolitical and market-related influences helps to account for the degree 
of convergence with EU norms at the stage of selection, it is less convincing in accounting for 
sustainability or unsustainability of convergence. The highest degree of convergence in terms 
of selection was achieved in Azerbaijan under high geopolitical pressure, but did not translate 
into any notable norm adoption and vanished completely from the agenda in the early 2010s, 
as far as the domestic energy sector is concerned. On the other side, a lower degree of 
convergence at the initial phase of supplier and consumer markets turned out to be sustainable 
in the case of Azerbaijan but not in that of Algeria. The explanatory shortcoming of the logic 
of consequences in this regard, raises the question, if more sociological and constructivist 
accounts can provide an added value.  
 
The limits of EU legitimacy and the decentring of external energy governance 
Based on the theoretical insight that EU norm export is not only about bargaining, the 
literature on Europeanisation and External Governance draws on alternative explanations, 
which focus more on legitimacy. Grounded in sociological institutionalism and derived from 
the underlying “logic of appropriateness” (March and Olsen, 1989), they assume that actors’ 
interests are not exogenously given, but vary according to their perceptions of what is 
appropriate behaviour in specific situations. From this perspective, decision-making 
deliberations of actors on whether to converge with norms or not depend on the 
appropriateness they attach to these norms, which is influenced by underlying ideas, 
identities, and role perceptions.  
The EU can influence the decision-making deliberations of neighbouring actors either by 
socialising them based on continuous interaction and normative suasion (Checkel, 2005), or 
more indirectly, by serving as model for imitation to address shortcomings of the domestic 
states quo (Schimmelfennig, 2012; Dolowitz and March, 1996).  
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Drawing upon this, explanations stipulate that the normative resonance of alternative norms is 
an important aspect in decision-making deliberations and raise the question whether EU 
norms, ideas and concepts behind them resonate with those of relevant domestic actors. 
Furthermore, accounts are concerned with the question of in how far neighbouring actors 
identify with the EU or alternative norm promoters (Barbé et al, 2009; Lavenex and 
Schimmelfennig, 2009; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). Both aspects of legitimacy are 
arguably not given with regard to both countries. Contrary to neighbours such as Moldova or 
Georgia, Azerbaijan and Algeria are authoritarian states, where public actors neither subscribe 
to the constitutive values of the EU, nor strive for EU membership. What is more, EU energy 
norms, which built upon principles of economic liberalism, cannot be expected to encounter a 
high degree of domestic resonance in countries, where a comprehensive state involvement in 
energy affairs is considered to be preferable and foreign energy companies are negatively 
associated with a colonial legacy, as in the case of Algeria. 
A fruitful analytical framework to shed light on other possible aspects of legitimacy is 
“decentring” (Bechev and Nicolaidis, 2010). Departing from the insight that the underlying 
“access-convergence logic”, i.e. the bargain of access to the EU’s market and institutions in 
return for adoption of EU norms is not very conducive in the neighbourhood, it explores ways 
to delink both. While decentring can mean many things, I focus on three points, which relate 
to the legitimacy of the process of setting and diffusing norms and the status of neighbouring 
countries in the institutions of energy cooperation. The underlying assumption is twofold: 
Firstly, socialisation can lead to outcomes, which reflect a certain degree of convergence with 
EU energy norms, if the EU allows for more “co-development”, “ownership” and “status” in 
its external energy governance. Secondly, since neighbouring actors consider a more 
decentred external energy governance to be more legitimate than the prescriptions of EU hard 
norms based on an “access-convergence bargain”, convergence is more likely to be 
sustainable.  
The first aspect of decentring can be subsumed under the notion “co-development”. It focuses 
on the question, in how far energy cooperation draws on shared policy goals and broader 
contents such as establishing a strategic gas corridor and modernising parts of the supply 
chain. Hence, it relates to the broader objectives and statements of intension, which denote the 
direction, which decision-makers wish to take (Dolowitz and March, 2000, 12). “Co-
ownership” raises a second aspect of decentring. It is concerned with the degree to which 
local actors co-own the processes of shaping specific norms and policies as well as the 
instruments and programmes, by which they are promoted. Instruments like twinnings and 
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networks feature the advantage that they can engage relevant public and private actors to 
develop and promote shared diagnostics and solutions rather than relying on prescribed EU 
frames for the transfer of hard norms. While co-development typically involves actors on the 
decision-making level, co-ownership focuses on experts and bureaucrats on the less 
politicised, operational level. Furthermore, co-development and co-ownership consider the 
engagement of relevant private actors in the field of energy. Powerful energy companies have 
an important say in energy sectors, transnational infrastructure, and their regulation (Orttung 
et al., 2009). Thirdly, decentring raises the question of the “status” of neighbouring countries 
in the institutions of energy cooperation. Both suppliers repeatedly claimed a special strategic 
relationship with the EU for themselves, rather than being just a subsidiary neighbouring 
country (Darbouche, 2008; Nuriyev, 2008). This points to the fact that status in their relations 
with the EU matters to neighbouring actors. Strategic partnerships upgrade the status of 
partner countries and reflect better the underlying interdependence between the Union and its 
suppliers.  
Conceptually, socialisation based on decentring can be integrated in the array of constructivist 
explanations, which might underlie norm diffusion processes. Contrary to norm transfer, the 
concept of diffusion neither gives rationalist accounts a pre-dominant role (Börzel and Risse, 
2012), nor conceives neighbouring actors as mere objects subjected to EU prescription of pre-
defined hard norms (Barbé et al., 2009). Hence, it seems to be better suited to grasp 
sustainable convergence, in terms of shared and “softer” outcomes, as the result of more 
horizontal interaction between the EU, neighbouring and relevant economic actors. 
Accounting for convergence by analysing the decentring of EU External Energy Governance  
Initial decentring towards Azerbaijan and indirect influence on Algeria 
The major instrument of EU external energy governance towards Eastern neighbours in the 
early 2000s was “Interstate Oil and Gas Transportation to Europe” (INOGATE). The EU-
funded regional network aimed to initiate functional bi-lateral and regional energy 
cooperation in order to facilitate and secure gas transport to Europe as well as further 
convergence of energy markets with EU norms (Energy Charter Secretariat, 2011). 
Cooperation within the network allowed for co-development, as the ministries of 
neighbouring countries were able to set priorities together with the EU. In the case of 
Azerbaijan, cooperation was mainly bilateral and focussed on Azerbaijan’s objective to 
“gasifiy” the internal market and improve distribution networks. On the request of 
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Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Industry and Energy, EU experts provided administrative and 
technical assistance to their counterparts on the operational level. EU standards, norms, and 
principles of unbundling and market pricing were introduced and discussed during 
workshops, trainings and projects with regard to their capacity to overcome the structural 
problems of Azerbaijan’s distribution network and a lack of investment. This co-owned 
process provided EU experts with a continuous opportunity for normative suasion of 
Azerbaijani public actors. Since the latter lacked experience with regard to gas regulations, 
EU actors were able to shape the framing of identified problems and the envisioned solutions, 
based on their advanced knowledge and regulatory expertise. Hence, the achieved, notable 
degree of convergence in terms of rules selection was based on socialisation on the 
operational level and supported on the political level. As Azerbaijani public actors considered 
some degree of unbundling and market pricing as well as more technical EU standards to be 
appropriate, convergence proofed to be sustainable.  
EU external energy governance towards Algeria was embedded in the overarching Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). Functional, project-oriented instruments such, as the 
multilateral Euro-Mediterranean Energy Forum provided for co-development, yet political 
rivalries between Southern neighbours prevented Algerian actors from engaging (e.g. 
Darbouche, 2011b). However, selected and adopted norms regarding the establishment of an 
independent energy regulator and the liberalisation of the upstream sector, clearly reflected 
EU norms. These outcomes were not the result of socialisation favoured by co-development 
and co-ownership, but based on voluntary imitation of EU rules. Indeed, the Ministry of 
Energy under Khleil Chakib introduced a far-reaching liberalisation agenda independently 
from EU instruments, in order to increase production and improve distribution through FDI 
(Darbouche, 2011a). On the operational level, EU norms were evaluated by Algerian experts 
and served as established models for the modernisation of the Algerian energy sector. 
However, the adopted liberalisation norms were fiercely contested by a number of national 
actors and SONATRACH in particular. The debate focussed on the NOC as symbol of 
Algeria’s independence, whose dominant position along the supply chain was not to be 
jeopardised in favour of foreign companies (Darbouche, 2008). Eventually, liberalisation was 
revised as resistance grew and Chakib had to resign. As the EU failed to engage local actors 
on the operational and political level, it was more of a spectator than actor in this process. 
 
Counterproductive EU-centred prescriptions 
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In the light of high geopolitical pressure in the late 2000s, the EU managed to include precise 
EU provisions on unbundling, market pricing and TPA in the bilateral memorandum with 
Azerbaijan and the IGA on Nabucco. However, Azerbaijani decision-makers were never 
convinced of the appropriateness of the pre-defined, unilaterally prescribed norms, which 
would have imposed high costs and a loss of control. As Azerbaijan managed to 
counterbalance Russia’s geopolitical pressure through leaning more against Turkey and 
BOTAS, convergence with EU norms stalled. EU experts continued to cooperate with 
Azerbaijani experts on the operational level within a twinning project on legal approximation 
and structural reform of the energy sector (Sandtner, 2009). The co-owned cooperation 
therein, enabled EU experts to bring in their expertise and knowledge and to persuade 
Azerbaijani ministerial officials of the need for more market pricing and unbundling. 
Together, the experts jointly carved out draft laws reflecting EU norms in these points, but 
they hit political sands on the decision-making level, where priority was given to the 
implementation of the Southern Gas Corridor. However, the more it became clear in the late 
2000s, that the EU and the Nabucco Consortium were not able to implement the frontrunner 
project, but continued nonetheless to give priority to the overambitious pipeline, while 
ignoring more feasible projects, the more convergence vanished from the Euro-Azerbaijani 
energy agenda.  
With regard to Algeria, EU external energy governance faced a “deadlock”. Algeria 
repeatedly rejected the whole edifice of EU energy norms and the “access-convergence logic” 
(Youngs, 2009, 9). In the light of the Russo-Ukrainian crisis in 2006, Algeria reached out to 
the EU in order to put energy cooperation on a new basis of a strategic partnership, focussing 
on more pragmatic, bilateral cooperation on infrastructure. However, the Commission’s draft 
proposal for such a partnership did not deviate from its regulatory convergence approach, 
while in the eyes of Algerian actors, the unilaterally promoted EU hard norms had completely 
lost their legitimacy in the light of the failed liberalisation (Darbouche, 2008). Facilitated by 
increasing revenues, Algeria continued to pursue additional production and pipeline projects 
alone or in cooperation with European energy companies, which had no interest in including 
TPA provisions in bilateral IGAs. 
 
Recent decentring towards both strategic partners 
As the Commission dropped its clear preference for the Nabucco pipeline in the early 2010s 
in the light of the resistance from Azerbaijan and European companies involved in the SD-2 
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gas production, external energy governance became more decentred in this point. President 
Barosso and Aliyev (2011) signed a new memorandum on a strategic energy partnership in 
2011. It singled Azerbaijan out, as the strategic key partner in the Southern Corridor, delinked 
the cooperation on infrastructure from stalling convergence in the energy sector and provided 
for more co-development with Azerbaijani decision-makers and private European energy 
companies with regard to the final decisions on the routing, capacity, and specifications of the 
different parts of the corridor. In this context, the Commission ceded to insist on rigid TPA 
provisions of the obsolete Nabucco IGA, but started to openly discuss the regulation of 
TANAP and the European section with experts from all involved companies and Azerbaijan 
as major partner on the operational level. While, the final shape of the corridor clearly differs 
from the one initially foreseen by the Commission, its regulation still reflects some limited 
convergence with EU norms, despite the lack of TPA provisions. Indeed, the drafters of the 
Nabucco IGA managed to persuade public and private actors of the appropriateness of the 
EU’s principle ideas on tariff pricing and investment protection, which were eventually 
integrated and adopted in the TANAP IGA (Weber, 2014b). 
In 2013 the Commission also singled out Algeria as a strategic partner, by signing a 
memorandum on a strategic partnership. It prepares the ground for more co-development as it 
focuses on European investment in the upstream sector and the development of shale gas, but 
refrains from referencing repeatedly refused EU hard norms. The major issues of the 
agreement are key for Algeria in order to address its supply and production challenges ahead. 
Furthermore, the memorandum foresees the accession of the Algerian energy regulator to the 
Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), a EU financed expert network on 
the operational level. This could depoliticise energy cooperation and enable for more co-
ownership, with regard to the regulation of upstream and transmission. Whether this move 
towards a more decentred EU external energy governance will lead to more and sustainable 




The analysis of the borderline cases Azerbaijan and Algeria displays the limits of EU external 
energy governance to export EU energy norms to third countries in order to regulate their gas 
markets and shared transnational infrastructure. Furthermore, it points out the shortcomings of 
over-simplistic concepts to grasp convergence with EU energy norms as well as the limits of 
major explanations in literature to account for it. Taken together, three points can be 




Firstly, the EU’s vision of extending the scope of the binding energy acquis to all 
neighbouring countries by fully integrating them in a EU-centred, pan-European energy 
market for gas is not a realistic one. While EU hard norms mismatch with supplier interests 
and do not encounter a favourable domestic resonance in both countries, the EU does not hold 
a superior bargaining power to coerce its energy-rich neighbours. Hence, an over-ambitious 
“1:1 transfer” of EU norms is misleading. Indeed, the empirical picture in the two supplier 
countries is more nuanced and discloses variance of convergence with EU energy norms in 
terms of both, the degree of convergence and its sustainability.  
Secondly, explanations focussing on EU bargaining power are of limited help to account for 
convergence in the field of energy, as they highlight the role of EU coercion and tend to 
understate the relevance of other external influences for cost/benefit calculations of 
neighbouring actors; namely gas markets and geopolitics. The latter drive decision-making 
deliberations of neighbours with regard to EU energy norms more than EU incentives do. 
While factoring in markets and geopolitics helps to account for a high degree of convergence 
in Azerbaijan and rejection of EU norms in Algeria in the late 2000s as well as for a limited 
degree of convergence during periods of shifting markets in the early 2000s and 2010s, it 
cannot explain the sustainability of convergence. 
Thirdly, despite volatile markets and geopolitics, EU external energy governance can achieve 
sustainable convergence, if it refrains from prescribing pre-defined EU hard norms and 
relying on the access-convergence logic, but allows for more decentring instead. Allowing for 
more co-development and co-ownership with neighbouring actors and rewarding them an 
upgraded partnership status can increase the otherwise limited legitimacy of the process of 
norm export. In order for EU external energy governance to be effective in ensuring 
sustainable convergence, public neighbouring actors on the decision-making and operational 
level need to be engaged, while the involvement of energy companies is further necessary 
with regard to the regulation of transnational infrastructure.  
While the decentring of external energy governance seems to be the only way to ensure a 
certain degree of convergence with EU energy norms in Azerbaijan and Algeria, the 
persisting geopolitical and economic conflicts between Russia and Ukraine render it 
strategically indispensable to ensure EU gas supply security. 
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